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While Don’s paper does shed new insight on the
evaluation of Bayesian bounds in a frequentist light,
the main point of the paper seems to be a radical re-
examination of the relevance of the whole Bayesian
approach to confidence regions. This is surprising
given that the disagreement between classical and
frequentist perspectives is usually quite limited (in
contrast with tests) in that the coverage statements
agree to orders between n−1/2 and n−1, following
older results by Welch and Peers (1963).
First, the paper seems to contain a lot of apoc-
ryphal deeds attributed to Thomas Bayes. My un-
derstanding of the 1763 posthumous paper of Tho-
mas Bayes is one of a derivation of the posterior
distribution of a probability parameter θ driving
a binomial observation x ∼ B(n, θ). It thus fails to
contain anything about confidence statements or lo-
cation parameters, in relation with the “translation
invariance” mentioned in the Introduction or in Sec-
tion 7. As noted by Fienberg (2006), Thomas Bayes
also does not introduce explicitly the constant prior
as a rule, even in his limited perspective, this had
to wait for Pierre Simon de Laplace twenty to thirty
years later. Thanks to Don’s paper, however, I re-
read Bayes’ essay (in Edward Deming’s 1940 reprint)
and found in both RULE 2 (page 400 and further)
and RULE 3 (page 403 and further) that Bayes ap-
proximated the (posterior) probability that the pa-
rameter θ is between x/n − z and x/n + z. How-
ever, a closer examination revealed that this part
(starting on page 399) had actually been written
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by Richard Price (even though Price mentions “Mr
Bayes’s manuscript”).
My second and more important point of contention
is that the Bayesian perspective on confidence (or
credible) regions and statements does not claim “cor-
rect coverage” from a frequentist viewpoint since it
is articulated in terms of the parameters. Probabil-
ity calculus remains probability calculus whether it
applies to the parameter space or to the observation
space, making the comment about the term probabil-
ity [being] less appropriate in the Bayesian weighted
likelihood quite debatable. Following Jaynes (2003),
“there is only one kind of probability.” The title of
the paper is thus in complete contradiction with the
purpose of Bayesian inference and the chance iden-
tity occurring for location parameters is a coinci-
dence on which one should not build sand castles.
I find Bayesian analysis neither quick (although it
is logical) nor, obviously, dirty (on the opposite, it
proposes a more complete and more elegant inferen-
tial framework!). Looking at a probability evaluation
on the parameter space being “correct” (Section 3)
is also strange in that the referential for a Bayesian
analysis is the prior endowed space, not the conse-
quences on observable values that have not been ob-
served to paraphrase Harold Jeffreys. A Bayesian cre-
dible interval is therefore correct in terms of the pos-
terior distribution it is derived from and it does not
address the completely different target of finding
a frequency-valid interval. (The distinction made in
the Bayesian literature, as, for example, Berger, 1985,
between confidence and credible intervals is signifi-
cant for those different purposes.) That a β quanti-
le Bayesian confidence bound does not exclude the
true value of the parameter in 100β% of the obser-
vations is not a cause for worry when considering
only the observed y0 and the example of Section 4
is perfectly illustrating this perspective. When I see
on Figure 4(c) that the Bayesian coverage starts at 1
when θ = θ0 I am indeed quite happy with the fact
that this coherent procedure accounts for the fact
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that θ cannot be lesser than θ0. I thus strongly ob-
ject to the dire conclusion of Bayes approach [be-
ing] viewed as a long history of misdirection! I also
fail to understand what is the meaning of “reality”
in Section 7. When running Bayesian inference, the
parameter θ driving the observed data is fixed but
unknown. Having a prior attached to it has noth-
ing to do with “reality,” it is a reference measure
that is necessary for making probability statements
(or, quoting again from Jaynes, 2003, extending the
logics framework). Thus, the apparently logical con-
cern in Section 7 on how probabilities can reasonably
be attached to a constant has no raison d’eˆtre, nei-
ther does the debate about where the prior comes
from (Section 9). If the matter is about improper
versus proper priors (as hinted at by the comments
about marginalization paradoxes), this has been ex-
tensively discussed in the literature and the differ-
ence seems to me less important than the difference
between Bayes and generalized Bayes estimators.
While this is directly related to the above, the dis-
cussion in the Paradigm section also confuses me. In-
troducing a temporal order between y1 and y2 does
not make sense from a probabilistic viewpoint. Both
representations f(y1)f(y
0
2
|y1) and f(y
0
2
)f(y1|y
0
2
) are
equally valid. I note as a side remark that the deriva-
tion of f(y1|y
0
2
) as the collection of simulated y1’s
for which y2 = y
0
2
is exactly the starting point of the
ABC (Approximate Bayesian calculation) algorithm
(Rubin, 1984; Pritchard et al., 1999).
I further object to the debate about optimality
(and the subsequent relevance of Bayes procedures),
as I do believe that decision theory brings a useful
if formal representation of statistical inference. The
choice of the criterion that I understand as the choice
of the loss function is clearly important; however, it
helps in putting a meaning to notions like “real”
or “true” or “correct” found in the paper. Chang-
ing the criterion does change the outcome for the
“optimal” interval, but the underlying relevance of
Bayesian procedures does not go away. For instance,
we proposed in Robert and Casella (1994) several of
such losses for evaluating confidence sets. The crit-
icism found at the end of this Section 9 is inap-
propriate in that the posterior quantile is neither
derived from a loss function nor evaluated under
a specific loss function, since the “nonzero” cur-
vature drawback stems from a frequentist perspec-
tive. Let me also add that, even from a frequen-
tist perspective, strange and counter-intuitive phe-
nomena can occur, like the domination of the clas-
sical confidence region by regions that are equal to
the empty set with positive probability (Hwang and
Chen, 1986).
In conclusion, I am quite sorry about the negative
(and possibly strident) tone of this discussion. How-
ever, I do not see a convincing reason for opening
afresh the Pandora box about the (lack of) justifica-
tions for the Bayesian approach, the true nature of
probability and the philosophical relevance of priors:
The last section is a nice and provocative enough col-
lection of aphorisms, although I doubt it will make
a dent in the convictions of Bayesian readers. Baye-
sian credible intervals are not frequentist confidence
intervals and thus do not derive their optimality
from providing an exact frequentist coverage.
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